Polo Democrático Alternativo

By: Lilia Solano

Introduction: A paradox

The current stage of the "transformation" of the Colombian State under the influence of the right-wing paramilitary presents us with an apparent paradox. On the one hand, on each passing day Colombians learn of the complexity and depth of the infiltration of death squads in the public institutions. However, at the same time, institutions such as the judiciary, the Congress and the office of the Prosecutor General seem to display some degree of independence from the Executive thus bringing to justice high ranked policy makers who have been directly involved in crimes against humanity through paramilitary groups. In short, the same institutions that have been infiltrated by the paramilitary are the ones that are making headways in holding public officers accountable.

This contradiction sets the tone for the current stage of the “transformation” of the Colombian State. Historically, the Executive concentrates in its hands too much power so that an authoritarian style, such as the one that is being displayed by President Alvaro Uribe eclipses the other branches of public power. For this reason, the mainline media want to give all the credit to Mr. Uribe as they present the current situation as a kind of spring cleaning operation that the Colombian President is carrying on. To substantiate their claims, the media point to the high rates of approval that Mr. Uribe still enjoys, according to some ready made and widely advertised polls.

A suggested answer: “low-intensity democracy”

However, Mr. Uribe’s "teflon efect" that seems to excuse him from any responsibility in the right wing’s dirty warfare in Colombia, is yet another effect of what some analysts call "low-intensity democracy." This watered down democracy is a state of affairs that is characterized by two conflicting realities that take place at the same time, one next to the other. On the one hand, an elite of policy makers strive after applying measures that aim at reinforcing the institutions that are vital for a democratic State to function as such, thus modernising it. Yet, at the same time, such elite allows for a modernisation that, paradoxically, is willing to co-opt political opposition in order to give room to what lies at the bottom of the whole modernisation project. In Colombia, such a bottom line is the weakening of the State in accordance to the neo-liberal agenda that started to be applied in the 1980’s under the administration of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990). A key element in this “low-intensity democracy” is the paradoxical coexistence of a new legal framework and political practices that should cancel each other out. The Constitution of 1991 introduced as new elements two important instruments in a democratic society: (a) devolution of power to municipalities and regions, and (b) recognition of new social actors, chiefly the so called civil society. This effort to modernise the Colombian State, with all its positive aspects, took place when the neoliberal agenda shifted to full gears under the presidency of Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994). This is a third aspect that should be considered as we wonder to what extent the paramilitary and the drug trafficking organizations are shaping the Colombian State nowadays.

Co-opting devolution: the emergence of the local baron

The signing of such important piece of the legal discourse was followed by a debatable arrangement that saw important figures of the international drug trafficking surrender to justice. The much advertised war against drugs was pushed to the back rooms and the by then already visible matrimony between the organized crime and the counter-insurgency war was shamelessly overseen.

At a regional level, drug barons took upon themselves the task of asserting their influence by any means. This process cannot be explained solely in terms of their military prowess. The influence of the criminal heavyweights was possible because of their collusion with local chieftains entrenched in the institutions of the State. The end result of the devolution of power to municipalities and regions, which in itself is a key element in the construction of a culture of democracy, was the empowerment of new local elites composed of long time political chieftains and emergent wealth drug barons. It does not come as a surprise to observe that the recent wave of arrests follows the line of command that is typical of regions that historically revolve around strong local men. Next to a paramilitary commandant (who is a strong drug trafficker at the same time) there can be found an equally strong local politician with a seat in the national parliament.

It has been argued that the State, acting as an absentee landlord, created a vacuum that was filled by paramilitary groups. However, the situation is more dramatic. Rather than an absentee, what we have in Colombia is a State whose basic democratic instances are being co-opted in order to reinforce an increasing concentration of wealth and power. A powerful democratic tool, such as devolution of power, became an instrument that gave local drug barons and paramilitary fronts a much needed legal clout.

Interestingly enough, the paramilitary grew there where drug trafficking was more robust. Medellin as the epicentre and the Middle Magdalena and Caribbean regions witnessed the emergence of an extremely powerful drug business that reached its peak in the 1980s. Drug barons played a key role dismantling civil organizations and politicians, mostly from the leftist parties, who questioned their activities and criminal enterprises. The most notorious case of the influence of drug trafficking in the control of the status quo was the political genocide that was committed against the Patriotic Union, a political experiment rooted in a peace effort that was significant in the said decade.

Once the devolution of power to the local levels began to be implemented, these regions were already fully under the control of local drug barons and politicians who partnered with them. To this scenario came Alvaro Uribe as the governor of the province of Antioquia (Medellin, its head city), with a clear mandate to finish up and seal what was started by well known drug trafficking organizations.

Devolution of power, a democratic achievement that has to be defended and reinforced, has become just another tool in the ”low-intensity democracy” which is being applied in Colombia. The results of this domestication are there for us to see: reshuffling of land ownership that favours the agro-industry and discourages farming at smaller scales, forcible displacement of entire communities in order to make room for either big landowners or multinational corporations (cf, Chiquita Banana, palm oil monopolies, etc.), massacres in order to intimidate local communities or selective killings of their spokespersons (priests, nuns, teachers, unionists, local leaders, etc.), destruction of the environment, impunity.

Co-opting social identity: The paramilitary as a “new actor”.

Alongside the devolution of power to the local level, there came the recognition of new social actors. Common people and their organizations at a grass root level found new and more effective ways to engage in decision making processes concerning their own affairs. The legal discourse of the Constitution of 1991 provided tools for communities to organize and actively participate in the construction of a more democratic culture. This is what the democratic ideal is all about.

It became evident that the legitimate interests of local communities ran counter to what moved local barons and politicos. In those places where drug trafficking was a more salient feature of the society, the local communities have already paid a high price in their efforts to not lend any legitimacy to the criminal organizations.

However, brutality is not always the more persuasive tool. Since the new Constitution of 1991 encouraged to emergence of different social actors, there were more sophisticated ways for drug traffickers and paramilitaries to claim legal status. There is no doubt that the meetings that paramilitary chiefs and politicians held in Santa Fe de Ralito a few years ago are clear examples of their efforts to reach some status as builders of a new Colombia.

President Alvaro Uribe’s peacemaking strategy renders such initiatives redundant. With much ado, his government has proceeded to incorporate into the Colombian society entire contingents of drug traffickers whose members only need to claim membership to any paramilitary group in order to achieve the status of a new social actor.

Once again, the recognition of a multifaceted civil society is another achievement that strengthens the democratic ideals in Colombia. As such, the Colombian social movement invests any effort defending it and reinforcing it. But again, a national elite that is intent on pushing the envelope of a “low-intensity democracy” co-opts the democratic ideal and creates legal loopholes for perpetrators of crimes against humanity to continue shaping the Colombian State and society.

Nevertheless, it is important to note a contradiction at this point. Both the paramilitary and the drug baron cannot claim an independent identity as social actors inasmuch as they claim, and still claim, to operate as State agents, surrogate or otherwise. Therefore, all of Mr Uribe’s efforts are redundant because they are not actors, they are agents of the State. Bringing the paramilitary to justice equate to holding the Colombian State accountable, its head of the State included. Indeed, the whole situation follows the description that one the paramilitary most notorious criminals, Salvatore Mancuso offered during his intervention in the Colombian Senate Hall in 2004. He described the paramilitary as a baby that the State had fathered, a baby that is now a full grown individual standing by his father.

Times of liberalization.

After two or so decades of experimenting with free market, South America at least is having second thoughts. The most recent changes in the region are trying to reverse the trend, perhaps not to the point of going back to any idyllic past, but to reinsert the market into its social soil and reclaim for the State a good portion of its role as the mediator between society and the market.

Colombia has been left alone in its obedience to the now almost extinct Washington Pact. The primary sector of the economy has received the most direct blow of the neoliberal model. As community and families lose access to land and feel forced to move to the cities, the whole agrarian production takes on a different face. The paramilitary and the drug barons have played an important role in what is now called a unique agrarian reform. This does not mean that land is being fairly redistributed, but that a new owner has come to the scene to take it all: either the paramilitary or the agro-industry.

From being a self-sufficient country in terms of food sovereignty, Colombia is moving towards becoming an importer of basic produces. Concerns that are typical of the industrialized countries that move them to subsidize their farmers are unheard of in Colombia. At the end, together with the new landowners (paramilitary and drug traffickers) the Colombian country side is subsidizing farming in Canada, the US, and Western Europe.

In spite of verbal messages to the contrary, the paramilitary chiefs that are now being interrogated by the Colombian authorities do not contemplate to give back to their original owners the land they snatched off their hands by violent means. The boundaries of land ownership that were set by the now triumphant paramilitary are there to stay. This new state of affairs is necessary for the continue implementation of the neoliberal model: new multibillionaire investment projects are on their way in terms of agro-industry, oil exploration, energy projects and new networks of highways. As a point in case suffice it to mention the resistance that a local native community, the U’was still wage against transnational oil corporations. The Colombian establishment has made it clear that its interest lies with the investors, not with its fellow citizens.

How is the paramilitary currently shaping the Colombian State? My contention is that as an important member of the elite, they are co-opting the democratic achievements of the Colombian society in order to gain the legal clout they need to cast in stone what they got by the use of machine guns, massacres, selective killings and overall corruption. All of their actions, committed for the sake and on behalf of the Colombian Sate pave the way for the country to insert itself in the current international free market scenario.

ANNEX

Congressmen Under Investigation

Senator Alvaro Garcia Moreno, Sucre. Arrested by order of the Supreme Court. He is being investigated for forming paramilitary groups and for his alleged responsibility in the massacre of Macayepo.

Representative Eric Morris, Sucre. Arrested by order of the Supreme Court. He is being investigated for forming paramilitary groups.

Senator Jairo Merlano, Sucre. Arrested by order of the Supreme Court. He is being investigated for forming paramilitary groups.

Representative Jorge Luis Caballero, Magdalena. Investigated by the Supreme Court for links with paramilitary groups.

Senator Alvaro Araujo, Cesar. Investigated by the Supreme Court for links with paramilitary groups.

Representative Alfonso Campo, Magdalena. Investigated by the Supreme Court for links with paramilitary groups.

Senator Mauricio Pimiento, Cesar. Investigated by the Supreme Court for links with paramilitary groups.

Representative Luis Eduardo Vives, Magdalena. Investigated by the Supreme Court for links with paramilitary groups.

Senator Dieb Maloof, Atlantico. Investigated by the Supreme Court for links with paramilitary groups.

Ex-Congresswoman Muriel Benito Revollo, Sucre. Arrested by order of the Penal Court. Investigated for direct involvement with paramilitary groups.

Congressmen Accused by “Jorge 40’s” Documentation:

Senator David Char, Atlántico. The Colombian Justice Bureau asked the Supreme Court to investigate why “Don Antonio” had a copy of a campaign act of the politician. David Char is named repeatedly in “Jorge 40’s” computer.

Senator Zulema Jattin, Córdoba. The Attorney General asked the Supreme Court to investigate why, in a recorded conversation between “Don Antonio” and another paramilitary, an alleged meeting is mentioned between Jattin and “Jorge 40”.

Senator Javier Cáceres, Bolívar. The Attorney General asked the Supreme Court to investigate why Cáceres is often mentioned in paramilitary conversations.

Senator Lidio García, Bolívar. Is named repeatedly in conversations between “Don Antonio” and other paramilitary.

Ex-Representative Pedro Peñalosa, Magdalena. One of the persons detained with Don Antonio was bearing the ID of one of Peñalosa’s bodyguards:

Meeting Places:

Santa fe de Ralito: According to senator Miguel de la Espriella, in this municipality of Tierralta, Córdoba, more than 40 politicians met with the paramilitary in 2001 to launch a political movement.

Pivijay: In 2001 a meeting took place in this village of the Magdalena where mayors and candidates to Congress discussed a joint political campaign alongside the paramilitary.

Curumaní: In December 2005 there was a meeting in this town of Cesar to pre-establish the Congress voting for the following year. The information regarding the meeting eventually leaked and that is why the “U” party and “Cambio Radical” voted a few of its candidates for that elections.

Sucre: A meeting was held between the politicians of Sucre and the men of “Jorge 40” to found the “Social Front for Peace”. They were searching the support of the Paramilitary for the Senate.

Partamilitary business in the Atlantic Coast:

Health. Subsidies exclude the majorities as 6300 pesos are being charged for every affiliate. Contracts for the major hospitals and the distribution of medication of the Atlantic coast have been monopolized. The provincial health departments are run by people designated by the paramilitary. A typical case is Soledad, Atlántico, currently under investigation.